Whistleblower Lawyer Blog

When the President signed the new financial reform bill into law today, new whistleblower provisions quietly took effect to battle corruption, bribery, and corporate fraud to obtain foreign government contracts.

This new law creates the new SEC whistleblower program that we have followed since its gestation after the Madoff scandal broke. The SEC and the U.S. Department of Justice share jurisdiction over a growing and increasingly important area of enforcement, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).

Bribery of foreign government officials in international business transactions, and false entries in books and records of those companies within the statute, are the targets of the FCPA. Whistleblowers whose information helps the SEC recover monetary sanctions from those corrupt entities in FCPA cases now have an enforceable right to a monetary award of 10-30%.

Based on the increasing number and size of these FCPA cases, the rewards to whistleblowers can be meaningful--as they must be to cause whistleblowers to come forward. Over the past decade, the government has pursued more and more FCPA cases, and some recover hundreds of millions of dollars.

Recall that, in late 2008, Siemens agreed to pay more than $1.6 billion to the United States and Germany, after allegedly paying "$1.4 billion in bribes to government officials in Asia, Africa, Europe, the Middle East and the Americas." Announcing the guilty plea and settlement, the government described "a corporate culture in which bribery was tolerated and even rewarded at the highest levels of the company."

The SEC obtained $350 million in disgorgement from that settlement, which was the largest FCPA settlement to date.

In announcing that 2008 recovery, the government explained that "there is no question that the Department has in recent years significantly increased its FCPA enforcement. From 2001 to 2004, the Department resolved or charged 17 FCPA cases. For the period of 2005 to 2008, that number is 42 resolutions, representing an increase of more than 200 percent within these four years as compared to the prior four-year period."

With money scarce both at home and abroad, it is even more urgent to recoup funds lost to fraud. The new SEC whistleblower awards and Commodity Futures Trading Commission rewards should prompt more efficient law enforcement efforts to stop this fraud, just as the False Claims Act and the new IRS Whistleblower Program have shown is possible.

This corruption harms legitimate businesses, who cannot compete when corruption prevents a level playing field. This crime also causes damage to others, as the government explained in announcing the Siemens settlement. That transcript is reprinted below, and in part states:

For let there be no doubt that corruption is not a victimless offense. Corruption is not a gentlemen's agreement where no one gets hurt. People do get hurt. And the people who are hurt the worst are often residents of the poorest countries on the face of the earth, especially where it occurs in the context of government infrastructure projects, contracts in which crucial development decisions are made, in which a country will live by those decisions for good or for bad for years down the road, and where those decisions are made using precious and scarce national resources.

To illustrate the types of corruption this new whistleblower law should bring to light more often, the government's announcement of the 2008 Siemens settlement is reprinted below:

Continue reading "New Rewards for Whistleblowers Reporting Bribery of Foreign Government Officials, Corporate Fraud In Foreign Government Contracts" »

The new financial reform bill that awaits the President's signature this week has something important for potential whistleblowers with knowledge of fraud in options, futures, derivatives and other financial products within the jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). The bill will modify the Commodity Exchange Act to provide whistleblower rewards and protections.

Similar to the new SEC whistleblower awards for persons who reports securities fraud, the rewards to whistleblowers will be available if the CFTC recovers monetary sanctions of more than $1 million because of the whistleblower's information.

Like SEC whistleblowers, CFTC whistleblowers will have an enforceable right to 10-30% of what the CFTC recovers in substantial cases when the whistleblower has "voluntarily provided original information to the Commission that led to the successful enforcement of the covered judicial or administrative action, or related action." (Section 748 of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, reprinted below).

Crucial to the success of these new whistleblower programs, whistleblowers will know that they will receive at least 10% of the recovery in significant cases when the whistleblower meets the law's criteria.

The history of the nation's major whistleblower statute, the False Claims Act, shows that guarantees of meaningful rewards are the critical element in causing whistleblowers to report substantial fraud. Fraud recoveries increased dramatically once Congress amended the False Claims Act in 1986 to provide meaningful whistleblower rewards of 15-25% in cases in which the government intervenes.

The new IRS Whistleblower Program is proving the same point, as quality submissions have poured in now that a right to a meaningful whistleblower award exists.

Congress has set forth general criteria for the CFTC to determine the amount of the award within the 10-30% range. Factors that the CFTC will consider include:

"(I) the significance of the information provided by the whistleblower to the success of the covered judicial or administrative action;

‘‘(IV) such additional relevant factors as the Commission may establish by rule or regulation".

Continue reading "Whistleblowers Reporting Derivatives Fraud? Whistleblower Incentives Must Be Paid by CFTC Under New Financial Reform Bill" »

Since the SEC refused for years to heed Madoff whistleblower Harry Markopolis' warnings that Madoff was running a Ponzi scheme, we have followed with great interest the efforts of those who sought to create the first meaningful SEC whistleblower program.

The Senate this week took an important step by authorizing a new SEC whistleblower program--one more potent than the SEC apparently wanted--as part of the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.

When the Madoff fiasco surfaced, Congress asked why the law failed to encourage SEC whistleblowers to come forward, in the same way the qui tam whistleblower provisions of the False Claims Act have been so successful in rewarding whistleblowers for helping stop fraud against the government. Those same principles in the new IRS Whistleblower program have caused an explosion of valuable information presented by whistleblowers in exposing tax liability of many billions of dollars.

SEC leadership helped shape the tepid House version, which would have made rewards to whistleblowers wholly discretionary.

When we criticized the House version of the proposed SEC whistleblower rewards for that reason, staffers of the Senate Banking Committee contacted us to discuss what a meaningful whistleblower program should include, based on our experience with whistleblowers under the False Claims Act and IRS Whistleblower program. Our response was that, at minimum, a whistleblower with information about significant fraud must have a legally enforceable right to a meaningful reward.

Fortunately, the Senate version included such a right to an award of 10-30% in substantial cases, and the Senate view ultimately prevailed (see below text of whistleblower provisions in Section 922).

It remains to be seen how SEC leadership will respond. At this spring's Offshore Alert Conference in Miami, an SEC official listened to his panelists describe how successful mandatory rewards have been in causing whistleblowers to come forward in False Claims Act cases and IRS Whistleblower claims, yet apparently failed to "get" that SEC whistleblowers need a similar incentive to come forward in the best cases.

In our experience in representing whistleblowers, persons with the most significant information will rarely come forward without an enforceable right to a meaningful reward. The SEC has not exactly fostered public confidence in its judgment in recent years. If it embraces whistleblowers as Congress has directed, the SEC will find that--like the IRS Whistleblower Office--it will receive better, and dramatically more, information about fraud within its jurisdiction.

The full text of section 922 regarding SEC whistleblowers is reprinted below:

Continue reading "New SEC Whistleblower Program Approved by Senate in Financial Reform Bill" »

This morning's Washington Post quotes me, among others, in criticizing one aspect of the new procedures for IRS whistleblowers recently published in the Internal Revenue Manual. That one glaring defect aside, the new IRM procedures are welcome news that should encourage more IRS whistleblowers to come forward.

Today's Post article by David Hilzenrath on the IRS whistleblower procedures makes the following point, among others:

"There's apparently an institutional resistance to rewarding whistleblowers that will take some time to dissipate," said Michael A. Sullivan of the law firm Finch McCranie, who represents whistleblowers. "Counterproductive rules such as this one may be a result of that resistance," he said.

When information from whistleblowers helps the IRS recover unpaid taxes, the informants are entitled to as much as 30 percent of the proceeds. However, the new manual explains that the tipster is out of luck if, instead of yielding a payment to the IRS, the tip stops a refund or reduces a credit.

That rule, which we understood was already the view of some at the IRS, makes no sense. If two whistleblowers each can save the Treasury $100 million or $1 billion, there is no reason why one should be rewarded and the other one not rewarded, simply because one whistleblower's information thwarts an improper claim for a refund. Instead, each should be rewarded for saving taxpayer funds.

The Tax Court will likely correct this absurd result, but why not set up the procedures sensibly in the first instance?

From my dealings with the IRS Whistleblower Office representatives, they are not the source of this problem. They are sensible and capable professionals who want to see the IRS Whistleblower program work, and it should work to reduce the federal deficit by collecting from tax cheats.

Encouraging whistleblowers to come forward with meaningful information is essential to that effort. Overall, the new IRM procedures should encourage whistleblowers to submit claims, as we tell our clients who increasingly report sophisticated tax schemes that can cost taxpayers billions of dollars.

Among the real "plusses" in the new procedures is a long-needed mechanism for the IRS to share information with the whistleblower and whistleblower's attorney about the claim. IRS Whistleblower Office Director Steve Whitlock has long spoken of the need to do so, and the Whistleblower Office has delivered with these new procedures.

Other common sense improvements in this IRM revision are its approvals of using information that the whistleblower and the whistleblower's lawyer can provide in ongoing multiple interviews. This is the approach that has worked so well with qui tam whistleblower cases under the False Claims Act.

Furthermore, the criteria by which the Whistleblower Office will make awards are not spelled out, and in a thoughtful manner that shows careful consideration by the Whistleblower Office staff.

The 'institutional resistance" is already crumbling, in the face of what makes sense. Tax whistleblowers are now welcome, and will come forward in increasing numbers.

And, unless Senator Grassley someone gets rid of it first, we look forward to challenging and overturning in Tax Court the nonsensical rule criticized above.