Whistleblower Lawyer Blog

Yesterday's Wall Street Journal reports a "sweeping" insider trading investigation, with civil and criminal charges soon to follow, involving "consultants, investment bankers, hedge-fund and mutual-fund traders, and analysts across the nation."

While the details remain to be seen, the unending series of fraud cases that continue--despite Sarbanes-Oxley--proves why Wall Street must not be allowed to neuter the first potentially meaningful SEC whistleblower program, mandated by the Dodd-Frank financial reform law.

How is it that the hallowed "compliance programs" born from Sarbanes-Oxley have utterly failed to stop the breathtaking frauds of Madoff, Stanford, and other recent post-SOX scandals?

As many honest employees encountering fraud discover, too often "compliance programs" mask efforts to identify employees who object to wrongdoing, so the wrongdoers can then gut their careers.

How well did compliance programs work at the many Madoff-abetting feeder funds that made scores of millions, as Madoff's scheme spread to snare more victims? Read Harry Markopolis' book to see how many of those firms' "compliance" efforts worked, as Madoff's enablers ignored glaring warning signs that multiplied over the life of the scheme.

SEC Chair Mary Schapiro and Director of Enforcement Robert Khuzami seem dedicated to invigorating the SEC's enforcement efforts. While the new proposed SEC whistleblower rules show considerable thought, they threaten the program's effectiveness by bowing too far to industry concerns, and excluding many potential whistleblowers such as accountants, who may be the best position to stop the next Madoff.

Wall Street would have the SEC create a labyrinth of further exceptions to who can participate in the new SEC Whistleblower program. One lethal industry proposal is to require potential whistleblowers first to run the gauntlet of firms' "compliance" programs--a concept wholly inconsistent with Congress' intent that whistleblowers must be allowed to report violations anonymously.

The initial screening of SEC whistleblower claims should not be outsourced to the very firms alleged to have violated the law, which is what mandatory internal reporting effectively would do. The SEC--like the Department of Justice and IRS--should be the first to screen SEC whistleblower claims. With any SEC whistleblower claim large enough to pursue, by definition the culpable firm has typically approved the violation, or at least looked the other way.

Otherwise, who in a position to expose significant fraud would come forward, if required first to reveal their objections to the fraud to those who may have approved it? And if the fraud stays concealed--as it too often has despite "compliance" programs--the public loses.

Excerpts from the WSJ article by SUSAN PULLIAM, MICHAEL ROTHFELD,JENNY STRASBURG and GREGORY ZUCKERMAN are below:

Continue reading "Insider Trading Probe Reinforces Immediate Need for Strongest SEC Whistleblower Program" »

We have been awaiting the SEC's proposed rules for its new SEC Whistleblower Program, released yesterday. Even before the announcement, however, those who oppose this first potentially meaningful SEC Whistleblower Program have begun efforts to undermine it.

The SEC's website already includes some firms' suggestions to impose extreme restrictions on SEC whistleblowers--contrary to how other successful whistleblower programs operate.

Designing any new whistleblower program should begin with studying more than two decades of successes of the nation's major whistleblower law, the False Claims Act. The False Claims Act has been so effective in uncovering and penalizing fraud against the government since 1986 that it has inspired Congress and the states to enact a wave of new whistleblower statutes--including the Dodd-Frank whistleblower mandate in section 922.

Unless the SEC seeks to create an ineffective program, it makes no sense to impose restrictions on whistleblowers that do not exist in False Claims Act cases.

One such damaging restriction would be requiring whistleblowers first to report within the company violations of the law, before going to the SEC. Past experience with the False Claims Act shows that warning violators of the law (who know their own violations) invites destruction of evidence by those who engineered the lawbreaking, and destroys the whistleblower's career.

Other deceptive suggestions are that the SEC follow the "approach" of the promising new IRS Whistleblower Program--but with far greater restrictions on whistleblowing.

For example, one representative of future defendants urges what are actually variations on the "one-bite" and "no-bite" rules of the IRS, which historically have restricted the IRS's receipt of certain information, or information from certain whistleblowers.

In fact, the IRS trend appears to be the opposite. In a March 2010 IRS Notice and in June 2010 changes to the Internal Revenue Manual, the "one-bite" rule appears to be giving way to the more sensible approach of allowing whistleblowers more than "one bite" at submitting information that may be useful to the IRS.

Likewise, a suggestion that the SEC adopt a variation the "no-bite" rule would expand it far beyond the IRS concept of not accepting information from the "taxpayer's representative" before the IRS. This suggestion would go much further and prohibit submissions to the SEC by anyone who has a "fiduciary" duty to a public company--which arguably could be most or all employees.

We will comment further on the specifics of yesterday's proposed rules, but the basic principles above should guide the SEC in what it finally decides.

The SEC's announcement yesterday is reprinted below:

Continue reading "With New SEC Whistleblower Program Proposed Rules Announced, Will the SEC Allow Potential Defendants to Gut Them?" »