This new law creates the new SEC whistleblower program that we have followed since its gestation after the Madoff scandal broke. The SEC and the U.S. Department of Justice share jurisdiction over a growing and increasingly important area of enforcement, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).

Bribery of foreign government officials in international business transactions, and false entries in books and records of those companies within the statute, are the targets of the FCPA. Whistleblowers whose information helps the SEC recover monetary sanctions from those corrupt entities in FCPA cases now have an enforceable right to a monetary award of 10-30%.

Based on the increasing number and size of these FCPA cases, the rewards to whistleblowers can be meaningful--as they must be to cause whistleblowers to come forward. Over the past decade, the government has pursued more and more FCPA cases, and some recover hundreds of millions of dollars.

Recall that, in late 2008, Siemens agreed to pay more than $1.6 billion to the United States and Germany, after allegedly paying "$1.4 billion in bribes to government officials in Asia, Africa, Europe, the Middle East and the Americas." Announcing the guilty plea and settlement, the government described "a corporate culture in which bribery was tolerated and even rewarded at the highest levels of the company."

The SEC obtained $350 million in disgorgement from that settlement, which was the largest FCPA settlement to date.

In announcing that 2008 recovery, the government explained that "there is no question that the Department has in recent years significantly increased its FCPA enforcement. From 2001 to 2004, the Department resolved or charged 17 FCPA cases. For the period of 2005 to 2008, that number is 42 resolutions, representing an increase of more than 200 percent within these four years as compared to the prior four-year period."

With money scarce both at home and abroad, it is even more urgent to recoup funds lost to fraud. The new SEC whistleblower awards and Commodity Futures Trading Commission rewards should prompt more efficient law enforcement efforts to stop this fraud, just as the False Claims Act and the new IRS Whistleblower Program have shown is possible.

This corruption harms legitimate businesses, who cannot compete when corruption prevents a level playing field. This crime also causes damage to others, as the government explained in announcing the Siemens settlement. That transcript is reprinted below, and in part states:

For let there be no doubt that corruption is not a victimless offense. Corruption is not a gentlemen's agreement where no one gets hurt. People do get hurt. And the people who are hurt the worst are often residents of the poorest countries on the face of the earth, especially where it occurs in the context of government infrastructure projects, contracts in which crucial development decisions are made, in which a country will live by those decisions for good or for bad for years down the road, and where those decisions are made using precious and scarce national resources.

To illustrate the types of corruption this new whistleblower law should bring to light more often, the government's announcement of the 2008 Siemens settlement is reprinted below:

Similar to the new SEC whistleblower awards for persons who reports securities fraud, the rewards to whistleblowers will be available if the CFTC recovers monetary sanctions of more than $1 million because of the whistleblower's information.

Like SEC whistleblowers, CFTC whistleblowers will have an enforceable right to 10-30% of what the CFTC recovers in substantial cases when the whistleblower has "voluntarily provided original information to the Commission that led to the successful enforcement of the covered judicial or administrative action, or related action." (Section 748 of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, reprinted below).

Crucial to the success of these new whistleblower programs, whistleblowers will know that they will receive at least 10% of the recovery in significant cases when the whistleblower meets the law's criteria.

The history of the nation's major whistleblower statute, the False Claims Act, shows that guarantees of meaningful rewards are the critical element in causing whistleblowers to report substantial fraud. Fraud recoveries increased dramatically once Congress amended the False Claims Act in 1986 to provide meaningful whistleblower rewards of 15-25% in cases in which the government intervenes.

The new IRS Whistleblower Program is proving the same point, as quality submissions have poured in now that a right to a meaningful whistleblower award exists.

Congress has set forth general criteria for the CFTC to determine the amount of the award within the 10-30% range. Factors that the CFTC will consider include:

"(I) the significance of the information provided by the whistleblower to the success of the covered judicial or administrative action;

‘‘(IV) such additional relevant factors as the Commission may establish by rule or regulation".

The Senate this week took an important step by authorizing a new SEC whistleblower program--one more potent than the SEC apparently wanted--as part of the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.

When the Madoff fiasco surfaced, Congress asked why the law failed to encourage SEC whistleblowers to come forward, in the same way the qui tam whistleblower provisions of the False Claims Act have been so successful in rewarding whistleblowers for helping stop fraud against the government. Those same principles in the new IRS Whistleblower program have caused an explosion of valuable information presented by whistleblowers in exposing tax liability of many billions of dollars.

SEC leadership helped shape the tepid House version, which would have made rewards to whistleblowers wholly discretionary.

When we criticized the House version of the proposed SEC whistleblower rewards for that reason, staffers of the Senate Banking Committee contacted us to discuss what a meaningful whistleblower program should include, based on our experience with whistleblowers under the False Claims Act and IRS Whistleblower program. Our response was that, at minimum, a whistleblower with information about significant fraud must have a legally enforceable right to a meaningful reward.

Fortunately, the Senate version included such a right to an award of 10-30% in substantial cases, and the Senate view ultimately prevailed (see below text of whistleblower provisions in Section 922).

It remains to be seen how SEC leadership will respond. At this spring's Offshore Alert Conference in Miami, an SEC official listened to his panelists describe how successful mandatory rewards have been in causing whistleblowers to come forward in False Claims Act cases and IRS Whistleblower claims, yet apparently failed to "get" that SEC whistleblowers need a similar incentive to come forward in the best cases.

In our experience in representing whistleblowers, persons with the most significant information will rarely come forward without an enforceable right to a meaningful reward. The SEC has not exactly fostered public confidence in its judgment in recent years. If it embraces whistleblowers as Congress has directed, the SEC will find that--like the IRS Whistleblower Office--it will receive better, and dramatically more, information about fraud within its jurisdiction.

The full text of section 922 regarding SEC whistleblowers is reprinted below:

Today's Post article by David Hilzenrath on the IRS whistleblower procedures makes the following point, among others:

"There's apparently an institutional resistance to rewarding whistleblowers that will take some time to dissipate," said Michael A. Sullivan of the law firm Finch McCranie, who represents whistleblowers. "Counterproductive rules such as this one may be a result of that resistance," he said.

When information from whistleblowers helps the IRS recover unpaid taxes, the informants are entitled to as much as 30 percent of the proceeds. However, the new manual explains that the tipster is out of luck if, instead of yielding a payment to the IRS, the tip stops a refund or reduces a credit.

That rule, which we understood was already the view of some at the IRS, makes no sense. If two whistleblowers each can save the Treasury $100 million or $1 billion, there is no reason why one should be rewarded and the other one not rewarded, simply because one whistleblower's information thwarts an improper claim for a refund. Instead, each should be rewarded for saving taxpayer funds.

The Tax Court will likely correct this absurd result, but why not set up the procedures sensibly in the first instance?

From my dealings with the IRS Whistleblower Office representatives, they are not the source of this problem. They are sensible and capable professionals who want to see the IRS Whistleblower program work, and it should work to reduce the federal deficit by collecting from tax cheats.

Encouraging whistleblowers to come forward with meaningful information is essential to that effort. Overall, the new IRM procedures should encourage whistleblowers to submit claims, as we tell our clients who increasingly report sophisticated tax schemes that can cost taxpayers billions of dollars.

Among the real "plusses" in the new procedures is a long-needed mechanism for the IRS to share information with the whistleblower and whistleblower's attorney about the claim. IRS Whistleblower Office Director Steve Whitlock has long spoken of the need to do so, and the Whistleblower Office has delivered with these new procedures.

Other common sense improvements in this IRM revision are its approvals of using information that the whistleblower and the whistleblower's lawyer can provide in ongoing multiple interviews. This is the approach that has worked so well with qui tam whistleblower cases under the False Claims Act.

Furthermore, the criteria by which the Whistleblower Office will make awards are not spelled out, and in a thoughtful manner that shows careful consideration by the Whistleblower Office staff.

The 'institutional resistance" is already crumbling, in the face of what makes sense. Tax whistleblowers are now welcome, and will come forward in increasing numbers.

And, unless Senator Grassley someone gets rid of it first, we look forward to challenging and overturning in Tax Court the nonsensical rule criticized above.

Today, the SEC announced allegations of TARP fraud and securities fraud of more than $1.5 billion other violations against Lee B. Farkas, through his company Taylor, Bean & Whitaker Mortgage Corp. (TBW).

According to the SEC, Farkas "sold more than $1.5 billion worth of fabricated or impaired mortgage loans and securities to Colonial Bank. Those loans and securities were falsely reported to the investing public as high-quality, liquid assets. Farkas also was responsible for a bogus equity investment that caused Colonial Bank to misrepresent that it had satisfied a prerequisite necessary to qualify for TARP funds. When Colonial Bank's parent company — Colonial BancGroup, Inc. — issued a press release announcing it had obtained preliminary approval to receive $550 million in TARP funds, its stock price jumped 54 percent in the remaining two hours of trading, representing its largest one-day price increase since 1983."

Perhaps the SEC is showing a new attitude after the Madoff debacle. Whistleblowers should soon be able to participate in the new SEC whistleblower program, which is part of the financial reform legislation now being hashed out in conference committee.

The SEC's full release is reprinted below:

The new provisions for IRS Whistleblower claims address many details of how tax whistleblower claims will be handled. The full provisions are reprinted below:

Part 25. Special Topics
Chapter 2. Information and Whistleblower Awards
Section 2. Whistleblower Awards

25.2.2 Whistleblower Awards
25.2.2.1 Overview: Authority and Policy
25.2.2.2 General
25.2.2.3 Submission of Information for Award under Sections 7623(a) or (b)
25.2.2.4 Initial Review of the Form 211 by the Whistleblower Office
25.2.2.5 Grounds for Not Processing Claims for Award
25.2.2.6 Processing of the Form 211 7623(a) Claim for Award
25.2.2.7 Processing of the Form 211 7623(b) Claim for Award
25.2.2.8 Whistleblower Award Administrative Proceeding
25.2.2.9 Award Computation
25.2.2.10 Appeal Rights under section 7623(b)
25.2.2.11 Confidentiality of the Whistleblower
25.2.2.12 Funding Awards
25.2.2.13 Award Payment Procedures
25.2.2.14 Annual Report to Congress
Exhibit 25.2.2-1 1891 Letter
Exhibit 25.2.2-2 Rejection Letter – 1010 Letter
Exhibit 25.2.2-3 Acknowledgement Letter – Whistleblower Office
Exhibit 25.2.2-4 Debriefing Checksheet
Exhibit 25.2.2-5 Rejection Letter from the Whistleblower Office
Exhibit 25.2.2-6 Memorandum from Steven T. Miller, February 17, 2010
Exhibit 25.2.2-7 Sample Notice of Opportunity to Comment Letter
Exhibit 25.2.2-8 Sample Summary Award Report
Exhibit 25.2.2-9 Award Recommendation-Opportunity to Comment
Exhibit 25.2.2-10 Confidentiality Agreement
Exhibit 25.2.2-11 Sample Preliminary Award Report
Exhibit 25.2.2-12 Sample Determination Letter
Exhibit 25.2.2-13 Award Calculation Computation Guidelines

Today, the leading advocate for robust whistleblower laws has called for the Treasury Department and the IRS to account for their use of information provided by the "UBS whistleblower," Bradley Birkenfeld.

Sen. Chuck Grassley issued a press release today summarizing his letter to Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner and IRS Commissioner Douglas Shulman. Grassley commented on Swiss legislators' move today to "unravel a U.S.-Swiss treaty that would allow for the disclosure of more client information to allow U.S. officials to review cases for potential enforcement of U.S. tax laws."

"The action by Swiss legislators today to try to unravel an international treaty emphasizes the need for U.S. authorities to exhaust the information they have on U.S. taxpayers who use offshore accounts to evade taxes,” Grassley said. “Honest taxpayers deserve to know what's happened with what could be very valuable leads, and if it's nothing, they deserve to know why. It's a matter of tax fairness and law enforcement. And the IRS shouldn't wait for international agreements to fall into place when tax evaders can be identified through other appropriate tools.”

Grassley did not advocate for the UBS whistleblower's release from federal prison, however, but focused on the government's use of the information he provided. (See prior discussions of the UBS whistleblower's case here).

Grassley, more than anyone, is responsible for passage of the December 2006 legislation that created the first meaningful IRS Whistleblower Program. The promising new IRS Whistleblower Program was inspired by the great successes of the nation's primary whistleblower statute for exposing fraud, the False Claims Act.

Sen. Grassley's announcement and letter today are reprinted below:

Both in 2009 and 2010, Congress has removed obstacles to whistleblowers' use of this anti-fraud statute to address Medicare and Medicaid fraud, as well as fraud affecting every other federal program. As we have written about previously, the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (“FERA”) overruled key judicial decisions that had undermined the the False Claims Act's effectiveness.

This year, the landmark health care bill, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA”), limited the FCA's "public disclosure" bar, including by allowing the government to prevent dismissal of cases that it believes should proceed.

At the Health Care Compliance Association's "Fraud and Compliance Forum" on Sept. 26-28, 2010 in Baltimore, Rick Shackelford of King & Spalding, LLP and I will discuss the effects on health care organizations of these 2009 and 2010 changes to the False Claims Act.

Rick is an outstanding defense attorney in these cases, and I look forward to discussing these important changes in the False Claims Act from his perspective as defense counsel for hospitals, pharmacy providers, pharmaceutical and medical device companies, health plans, pharmacy benefits managers, managed care organizations, physician organizations, and other health care organizations; and from my perspective as a former defense counsel who for years has represented "whistleblowers" or relators in health care fraud and other cases under the qui tam (or whistleblower) provisions of the False Claims Act.

Using shell corporations and "nominee" entities established in the Cayman Islands, Switzerland, or a host of other countries that market "secrecy," those looking to conceal income from the IRS, or assets from potential creditors, have made offshore tax havens a booming business.

An interesting example of allegations of offshore tax violations was described in the Justice Department's announcement yesterday of the indictment of two Miami Beach hotel developers. Mauricio Cohen Assor and his son, Leon Cohen-Levy. They were charged with conspiring to defraud the United States and filing false tax returns. The government alleged as follows:

According to court documents, the two men and their co-conspirators used nominees and shell companies formed in tax haven jurisdictions, including the Bahamas, the British Virgin Islands, Panama, Liechtenstein and Switzerland to conceal their assets and income from the IRS. In order to further conceal their assets and income from the IRS, court documents state the men also provided false and forged documents to banks, opened bank accounts in the name of nominees, titled their personal residences and luxury vehicles in the name of shell companies, filed false and fraudulent tax returns, failed to file other tax returns, suborned perjury in a civil matter pending before the New York Supreme Court by directing individuals to testify falsely under oath, and induced other individuals to make false statements to federal law enforcement agents.

Both defendants are permanent resident aliens who, in 2000, received approximately $33 million from the sale of the New York Flatotel, according to the government. They transferred the proceeds using various Swiss bank accounts in the names of foreign nominee entities, including at least one "bearer share" corporation.

When bearer shares are used, the corporation's records do not list its owners, as the owners are whoever has physical possession of the stock certificates. As IRS Special Agent Scott Johnson testified by affidavit, "[b]earer share corporations are often used to hide the true ownership of assets because ownership records are not maintained and nominee officers and directors are often used to control the affairs of the corporation.'

Later, the defendants allegedly transferred the funds to accounts of nominee companies at that bank's New York location, and later to the escrow account of a Florida attorney. The government also alleged that defendants used the money to "fund a luxury lifestyle for themselves and for their family members."

Offshore tax abuse remains a great priority of the IRS, and thus is a major focus of many IRS Whistleblower claims. The new IRS Whistleblower Program recognizes that whistleblowers have an enforceable right to 15-30% of what the IRS recovers based on information whistleblowers provide.

The government's full press release is below:

The story by David S. Hilzenrath explains more of the "dance" between Birkenfeld and prosecutors as he apparently partially told the government what he knew about wrongdoing at UBS.

Birkenfeld blew an opportunity to avoid prosecution for his own crimes when he failed to disclose them to the government, according to his sentencing transcript.

An obvious fact most critics of his prosecution seem to miss is that neither Birkenfeld nor his attorneys disputed the prosecutor's statements at his sentencing that Birkenfeld probably would have avoided any prosecution had he simply told the whole truth to prosecutors. His later protests ring hollow because--when it mattered most--he failed to dispute the damning evidence that demanded his prosecution.

By concealing his own wrongdoing, Birkenfeld apparently also allowed his former client Igor Olenicoff to escape a prison term when the government negotiated probation for him.

I represent many IRS whistleblowers--some with knowledge of tax violations larger than the more than $700 million that UBS agreed to pay the IRS--and yet I remain baffled why Birkenfeld simply did not disclose his own wrongdoing up front.

As the prosecutor acknowledged, Birkenfeld could probably have walked away a free man--and a considerably richer man with the IRS whistleblower rewards--had he simply told the whole truth.

Then again, in his "60 Minutes" interview Birkenfeld had no good explanation why he was carrying diamonds into the country in a toothpaste tube--even as he tried to convince the world of points he refused to make at his own sentencing.

Those facts say something about the credibility of his protests that the "sky is falling" for IRS whistleblowers. It is not falling, at least for the honest IRS whistleblowers willing to tell the whole truth. IRS whistleblowers who tell the truth need not fear, simply because Birkenfeld had the bad judgment to withhold the truth.

At this morning's Offshore Alert conference in Miami, we heard from the SEC Chair's Senior Advisor Stephen Cohen on this subject, as well as insight from IRS Whistleblower Office Director Steve Whitlock on how the IRS Whistleblower Program is now designed to encourage whistleblower claims.

As we have observed previously about the bills that would create an SEC Whistleblower program, past experience shows that an enforceable right to a meaningful reward is essential to cause whistleblowers to come forward.

The SEC apparently resists guaranteeing whistleblowers a minimum percentage of dollars recovered, as evidenced by the House version of the bill that lacks this feature. The SEC’s Steve Cohen explained that the SEC does not wish to commit funds that might otherwise go to harmed investors. He nonetheless contended that the SEC’s proposal may be better for whistleblowers because it pays from a special fund designated for this purpose, based on sanctions imposed, not collected.

Compare the experiences of the Justice Department and the IRS, however. When each had whistleblower statutes that provided no meaningful right to a reward, whistleblower claims were small and few. We have written extensively about the dramatic successes of the False Claims Act since its rewards increased to meaningful levels in 1986.

Likewise, IRS Whistleblower Office Director Steve Whitlock described again today how large whistleblower claims have exploded since December 2006, when Congress doubled rewards to whistleblowers to 15-30%, and created an enforceable right to those rewards.

History proves that most whistleblowers simply will remain silent, without a right to meaningful rewards. The SEC will be dividing a small pie unless Congress again embraces this principle.

To protect investors, those with information about fraud must have every incentive to speak up--as early as possible--and to be heard. The Madoff debacle proved that point.

In our experience in representing whistleblowers in the financial industry, the Senate’s version of the SEC whistleblower changes is highly preferable. It creates a right to awards of 10-30%.

There are still glaring deficiencies, such as the provisions excluding auditors who have tried unsuccessfully to call attention to fraud within the organizations and auditing firms involved. It will be an interesting next few weeks as Congress debates the final result.

As we have discussed at length, in the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Congress recognized how effective the False Claims has been in recovering money for fraud against the government, by creating financial incentives for states that enact equally effective versions of the federal False Claims Act.

"Weaker" state versions of the False Claims Act do not qualify for the incentives, however. The Inspector General for the Department of Health and Human Services must approve a state's False Claims Act before the incentives are available. So far, the IG has approved fourteen state FCAs, while disapproving six other state acts.

Since then, Congress has closed loopholes in the False Claims Act exploited by those who steal taxpayer funds. The 2009 Fraud Enforcement Recovery Act made significant improvements to strengthen the nation's major whistleblower law, as we have summarized before. In March 2010, Congress modified the False Claims Act's "public disclosure" and "original source" provisions as part of the major health care overhaul, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.

This week, Grassley asked the Inspector General and Attorney General to review existing state False Claims Acts to ensure that they comply with these recent improvements to the federal False Claims Act.

“Updated information will help states fine tune existing state laws and state-level proposals, in order to be eligible for the federal incentive and beef up fraud-fighting efforts,” Grassley said. “This kind of effort at the state and federal level is more important than ever as Medicaid programs are expanded and face new burdens and growing fiscal challenges. Every dollar lost to fraud is one less dollar for those who depend on the program and harms the sustainability of the Medicaid program.”

First, Director Whitlock finally announced how the IRS will share information that will allow whistleblowers to understand the Whistleblower Office's decisions about what awards are made to whistleblowers.

A year ago in my interview with the IRS Whistleblower Office Director, Mr. Whitlock discussed the need to solve the vexing question of how the IRS can share this information with whistleblowers and their attorneys, while also complying with legal requirements for confidentiality of taxpayer information under section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code.

The new procedures described yesterday for what will happen with IRS Whistleblower claims--once the IRS has recovered money as a result of a whistleblower claim-- are as follows:

1. After the Whistleblower Office receives a report from the IRS Operating Division that handled the matter, the Whistleblower Office Analyst will review the files and recommend an award to the whistleblower.

2. That recommendation then will go to the Whistleblower Office Director for review and approval.

3. A summary of the award recommendation then will be provided to the whistleblower and the whistleblower's attorney for comment. That summary will identify:

(a) the amount of money collected by the IRS based on information provided by the whistleblower;

(b) the recommended award percentage to the whistleblower (15-30% of the funds recovered, unless an exception under the statute applies to lower the percentage);

(c) the factors considered by the IRS Whistleblower Office in reaching the recommended percentage;

(d) the recommended award amount; and

(e) the whistleblower's options upon learning of this recommendation.

In welcome news to whistleblower attorneys, the IRS Whistleblower office also will make available a "detailed" award recommendation to whistleblowers and their attorneys who sign a confidentiality agreement. The whistleblower and counsel then may review in person (but not copy) the documents in the IRS administrative file that are the basis of the award recommendation, and comment to the Director about the award. Violation of the confidentiality agreement will lead to reduction of the award.

The new procedures are to be published in the Internal Revenue Manual in June 2010, and later will be included in regulations, with an opportunity for notice and comment.

Representatives of the IRS Whistleblower Office will discuss the latest developments in the IRS Whistleblower Program, though which tax whistleblowers can receive up to 30% of recoveries by the IRS. Other IRS and DOJ representatives will take part as well, as they analyze what lawyers representing IRS whistleblowers should know in pursuing these claims.

Like last year's program, this one is a sell-out. I am looking forwarding once again to moderating a panel discussion, this time on "Protecting IRS Whistleblowers from Criminal and Civil Liability."

Among the important new developments to be discussed is the "clarification" issued in February 2010, on what contacts the IRS may have with whistleblowers (or "informants") who are current employees of taxpayers who are the subject of whistleblower claims. (The full notice is reprinted below.)

We expect there may be other major new developments to report at this year's IRS Whistleblower Boot Camp. We will update you upon returning from D.C. this week.

Often maligned for failing to protect investors before the recent financial crisis, the SEC now charges that Goldman structured and marketed a "synthetic collateralized debt obligation" (CDO) like those that "contributed to the recent financial crisis by magnifying losses associated with the downturn in the United States housing market," and then violated the federal securities laws in connection with that product.

The SEC's Complaint alleges a "securities fraud action against Goldman, Sachs & Co. (“GS&Co”) and a GS&Co employee, Fabrice Tourre ('Tourre'), for making materially misleading statements and omissions in connection with a synthetic collateralized debt obligation (“CDO”) GS&Co structured and marketed to investors. This synthetic CDO, ABACUS 2007AC1, was tied to the performance of subprime residential mortgage-backed securities (“RMBS”) and was structured and marketed by GS&Co in early 2007 when the United States housing market and related securities were beginning to show signs of distress."

The Complaint further charges:

Undisclosed in the marketing materials and unbeknownst to investors, a large hedge fund, Paulson & Co. Inc. (“Paulson”), with economic interests directly adverse to investors in the ABACUS 2007-AC1 CDO, played a significant role in the portfolio selection process. After participating in the selection of the reference portfolio, Paulson effectively shorted the RMBS portfolio it helped select by entering into credit default swaps (“CDS”) with GS&Co to buy protection on specific layers of the ABACUS 2007-AC1 capital structure. Given its financial short interest, Paulson had an economic incentive to choose RMBS that it expected to experience credit events in the near future. GS&Co did not disclose Paulson’s adverse economic interests or its role in the portfolio selection process in the term sheet, flip book, offering memorandum or other marketing materials provided to investors.

In sum, GS&Co arranged a transaction at Paulson’s request in which Paulson heavily influenced the selection of the portfolio to suit its economic interests, but failed to disclose to investors, as part of the description of the portfolio selection process contained in the marketing materials used to promote the transaction, Paulson’s role in the portfolio selection process or its adverse economic interests.

The full SEC anouncement is reprinted below.