Whistleblower Lawyer Blog

At the Healthcare Fraud Institute this past week, I was asked to address what steps whistleblowers should take to ensure confidentiality of emails with their lawyers. Although qui tam cases under the False Claims Act were the focus of our discussion, the same principles apply to tax whistleblowers and SEC whistleblowers.

Potential whistleblowers should never use their company's email system, or any email account shared with or accessible to another person, for communicating with their attorney or for gathering information or evidence to report to the government.

Although the law encourages whistleblowers to report fraud, whistleblowers can create unnecessary problems for themselves by not following this rule.

First, emails between whistleblowers and their attorneys are privileged and confidential, but the privilege can disappear and be waived if the communication is disclosed to others.

Second, qui tam whistleblower cases under the False Claims Act are filed with a court order "sealing" the case from public view, while the government investigates. If an email accidentally exposes the case, the whistleblower may have violated the court's "seal" order.

Third, alerting a defendant company that the whistleblower has reported the company's fraud to the government is almost certain to provoke retaliation against an employee who is a whistleblower. Immediate suspension or firing often follows. Although the False Claims Act and the SEC and CFTC whistleblower laws create remedies for retaliation, those remedies take time to achieve. They will not pay the whistleblower's mortgage next month--or this year.

We advise all of our clients that they must protect the confidentiality of their emails. Many people do not realize that emails sent from a company's computer system usually leave some record, even if the employee is accessing a personal Gmail account.

Continue reading "How Whistleblowers in Qui Tam, IRS, and SEC Whistleblower Cases Must Protect Email Communications" »

Every two years, attorneys prosecuting or defending qui tam whistleblower cases under the False Claims Act and other whistleblower laws gather for the Whistleblower Law Symposium.

We have written much about “qui tam” whistleblower cases under the False Claims Act. Since last year’s passage of the Dodd-Frank law, whistleblowers who help expose (1) violations of the securities laws or (2) commercial bribery of foreign government officials, now can receive rewards of 10-30% of money sanctions imposed under the new SEC Whistleblower Program. The new IRS Whistleblower program pays whistleblowers 15-30% of amounts recovered. These cases also help stop fraud against taxpayers and investors.

On October 21, an unusual group of national experts on these claims will gather for the Whistleblower Law Symposium, which our firm organizes every two years. Not only do we have senior attorneys from the Department of Justice and experienced whistleblower lawyers discussing qui tam cases, but the Director of the IRS Whistleblower Office Steve Whitlock will participate and explain the tax whistleblower program. Senior SEC attorneys also have stated that they wish to be part of our seminar to discuss the new SEC Whistleblower Program, and are seeking approval to participate.

This conference is broader in scope than any whistleblower law conference in the country of which I am aware, as we have a national faculty of lawyers on both sides of these cases, as well as some of the top government officials involved.

Registration is still open for those who want to register online here:

Please feel free to call or email me with any questions. The Agenda is below.

Continue reading "Qui Tam Whistleblower Cases, and the New Financial Whistleblower Programs by the SEC, CFTC, and IRS To Be Discussed at Whistleblower law Symposium" »

When the CFTC announced its final whistleblower rules yesterday, it answered many questions about how the new CFTC whistleblower program will work.

David Meister, the CFTC's Director of the Division of Enforcement, provided this summary according to the unofficial transcript our firm prepared of yesterday's CFTC public meeting:

The Commission will pay awards to eligible whistleblowers who provide original information to the Commission leading to a successful Commission enforcement action and the imposition of monetary sanctions in excess of $1 million.

To be award eligible, a whistleblower is not required, under our recommendation-- a whistleblower is not required to report his information internally to his employer. Staff believes that such a requirement would deter some whistleblowers from coming forward, which would undermine congressional intent.

Continue reading "How the New CFTC Whistleblower Rules Will Operate" »

The final whistleblower rules of the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) are being announced now at a CFTC open meeting. Like the SEC, the CFTC has rejected any provision that whistleblowers be required first to report internally the violations in question, but will treat internal reporting as a "positive" consideration in its awards.

The alternative pushed by business would have required all CFTC whistleblowers first to risk career suicide by reporting the boss’s wrongdoing to the boss himself.

Industry’s approach would have made the Commission the laughing stock of law enforcement, since no rational person with a career and a mortgage would risk reporting even major fraud with that requirement.

Fortunately, the CFTC put first its responsibility to protect the public, and is taking seriously its law enforcement duties by seeking to root out major frauds.

Madoff, Stanford, and the other major frauds of the past decade prove that internal compliance programs cannot protect the public. That is why Congress in Dodd-Frank demanded the first meaningful SEC and CFTC whistleblower programs.

We applaud the CFTC on this important stand, and look forward to reviewing the text of the final rules when made available.

Continue reading "CFTC Announces Final Whistleblower Rules, Rejects "Mandatory Internal Reporting" by Whistleblowers" »

Too often missing in today's discussions of Dodd-Frank's one-year anniversary is appreciation of efforts by CFTC and SEC leadership to build from scratch the effective new whistleblower programs mandated by Dodd-Frank.

With scant resources, each agency is creating an essential mechanism to protect today's investors from the next fraudulent scheme.

Let's start with the CFTC. When I met with Chairman Gary Gensler and his CFTC staff in March to discuss the CFTC's proposed whistleblower rules, I was struck by Chairman Gensler's focus on what improvements could be made to its "draft" commodities whistleblower rules.

The only non-lawyer in the room, Gensler seemed to grasp more quickly than anyone potential abuses that its draft rules would not correct.

CFTC Commissioner Bart Chilton has also recognized how essential an effective whistleblower program is to protect investors.

More importantly, even the CFTC's initial cut at its rules showed that it would not simply copy the SEC whistleblower rules' approach, but would independently design a meaningful program to protect the public by attracting significant whistleblower information to ferret out frauds.

Likewise, the SEC--whose whistleblower rules have been finalized--has shown a welcome commitment to making SEC whistleblowers welcome. Chair Mary Schapiro, Director of Enforcement Robert Khuzami, and other staff such as Steve Cohen, Jordan Thomas, and Sarit Klein put more than considerable thought and effort in refining the SEC whistleblower rules announced in May 2011.

Some in Congress seek to keep the SEC and CFTC so underfunded that they cannot protect the public effectively. As former SEC counsel Professor Don Langevoort observed, "Congress maintains increasingly tight control over SEC policy largely through the budgetary process, and having the Commission be habitually needy and under-resourced fits well within this strategy. The campaign contributions from various sources with an interest in securities regulation are large, and influential members of Congress hardly maximize their own political advantage by stepping aside and leaving the SEC free to do its work as it sees fit."

Continue reading "Progress with Dodd-Frank's Whistleblower Programs: CFTC and SEC Working to Deter the Next Big Schemes to Harm Investing Public" »

The SEC Whistleblower Program encompasses not only classic securities violations, but also violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA"), a topic we have followed closely.

This past week, the SEC filed and settled an FCPA case against Armor Holdings, Inc., and collected more than $5.6 million, while the Department of Justice added almost $10.3 million in criminal fines.

The SEC charged that Armor Holdings, Inc. engaged in a bribery scheme to sell body armor to U.N. peacekeeping missions. The Commission also alleged that Armor Holdings violated the federal securities laws' books and records and internal controls provisions by failing to account properly for commissions in 2001-2007.

Demonstrating the SEC's increased emphasis on FCPA enforcement, this case is one of 32 FCPA cases the Commission has filed since 2010. Bribery of foreign government officials for business is having increased repercussions.

According to the SEC's Complaint, through a U.K. subsidiary Armor Holdings paid more than $200,000 through an intermediary to a United Nations official who could send it business, and used a sham consulting agreement to disguise its actions. The result was more than $7 million in additional revenues, and more than $1.5 million in additional profits, according to the SEC.

Continue reading "SEC Charges FCPA Bribery Scheme--Feds Collect $15 Million" »

The suspense over the final SEC whistleblower rules ended with the SEC's release of its final whistleblower rules last week. The CFTC is to follow suit soon in announcing its own commodities whistleblower rules.

We have followed the SEC rules' development, after being part of the small group of pro-whistleblower attorneys who met with the Commissioners and staff and urged changes to the draft rules to make them effective.

In January, I had the opportunity to visit with SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro, Director Khuzami, and SEC staff, and then separately with Commissioners Luis A. Aguilar, Kathleen L. Casey, Troy A. Paredes, and Elisse B. Walter, to discuss changes to the proposed rules for the new SEC Whistleblower program.

The SEC apparently recognized that its draft whistleblower rules already were too slanted toward protecting industry, at the expense of the public.

The Commission wisely rejected business’s attempt to require all whistleblowers first to commit likely career suicide by reporting the boss’s wrongdoing to the boss himself.

Industry’s approach would have made the Commission the laughing stock of law enforcement, since no rational person with a career and a mortgage would risk reporting even major fraud with that requirement.

Fortunately, the SEC put first its responsibility to protect investors, and is taking seriously its law enforcement duties by seeking to root out major frauds. Madoff, Stanford, and the other major frauds of the past decade prove that internal compliance programs cannot protect the public. That is why Congress in Dodd-Frank demanded the first meaningful SEC whistleblower program.

The SEC also seemed to realize that its initial rules had too many exclusions, which were often vague and complex. Its initial rules created too much uncertainty about rewards, and would have left many major frauds undetected while investors suffer.

The SEC's announcement shows an effort to do what make sense by not excluding so many potentially valuable whistleblowers, who are essential to uncovering and understanding complex schemes.

With more than 300 pages, the SEC whistleblower rules still may be more complex than needed. All in all, however, the rules are an improvement over the first draft, and the SEC is to be commended for putting the public’s interest first.

Of interest to whistleblowers reporting fraud under the False Claims Act, the IRS Whistleblower Program, or the brand new SEC Whistleblower and CFTC Whistleblower Programs is an upcoming presentation, "Avoiding the Mistakes of the UBS/Birkenfeld Case: Protecting Whistleblowers from Criminal and Civil Liability."

This discussion is part of a fascinating gathering this April in South Beach--the OffshoreAlert Conference. As the brochure promises:

Where else could tax collectors mingle with tax minimizers, asset tracers with asset protectors, regulators with the regulated, whistleblowers with their former employers and crooks with prosecutors?

How to protect whistleblowers from criminal and civil liability was a topic my panel discussed at the 2010 IRS Whistleblower Boot Camp in Washington. Because we had the IRS Chief Counsel's Office participating in that discussion, we were unable to discuss directly what went wrong for Birkenfeld as he brought important information about tax evasion to the attention of the IRS, but ended up serving a prison sentence of 40 months. (We have written previously about Birkenfeld's errors revealed in the court record.)

At the OffshoreAlert Conference discussion this year, I will moderate the panel discussion about what can be done to protect whistleblowers from criminal and civil exposure. Joining me are former Justice Department official and former General Counsel of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Joe D. Whitley; former prosecutor and now whistleblower attorney Marc Raspanti; and federal and international tax attorney Richard Rubin.

The program description is reprinted below:

Continue reading "Offshore Alert Conference: Protecting Whistleblowers from Criminal and Civil Liability" »

Just as we have followed closely the development of the IRS Whistleblower program since Congress authorized it in December 2006, we are watching the birth of the new SEC Whistleblower program. In 2010's Dodd-Frank Financial Reform law, Congress mandated the creation of what could be the first meaningful SEC and CFTC Whistleblower programs.

Today, the SEC took a major step in announcing the first head of the nascent SEC Whistleblower Office: Sean McKessy, a former Senior Counsel in the SEC's Division of Enforcement from 1997 to 2000.

According to the SEC's announcement, "Mr. McKessy served as corporate secretary for both Altria Group, Inc. and AOL Inc., and as securities counsel for Caterpillar, Inc. In these roles, Mr. McKessy developed and supervised internal compliance and reporting programs related to the federal securities laws, served as corporate compliance officer, and coordinated the reporting of potential violations to boards of directors."

Robert Khuzami, Director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement, praised Mr. McKessy as "uniquely positioned to oversee the Commission's whistleblower program. The Enforcement Division and whistleblowers alike will greatly benefit from Sean's first-hand experience in bringing enforcement cases, handling whistleblower complaints and understanding the workings of internal corporate compliance programs."

We hope that Mr. McKessy seeks the advice of IRS Whistleblower Office Director Steve Whitlock, who has built the first IRS Whistleblower Office over the past four years. Mr. Whitlock's Office has attracted many claims in the billions of dollars that will help stop tax cheats from burdening other taxpayers with their share of the tax load.

The SEC would also do well to resist industry's pleas to ignore principles that have worked so successfully for 25 years in encouraging whistleblower claims under the False Claims Act, the nation's major whistleblower law.

Last month, I had the opportunity to visit with SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro, Director Khuzami, and SEC staff, and then separately with Commissioners Luis A. Aguilar, Kathleen L. Casey, Troy A. Paredes, and Elisse B. Walter, to discuss the proposed rules for the new SEC Whistleblower program.

Each of the SEC Commissioners seemed interested in how the False Claims Act and the IRS Whistleblower program have encouraged significant claims--with no harm to corporate compliance programs. Let's hope each of them fully uses this opportunity to stop the next round of Madoffs, by establishing the nation's first meaningful SEC Whistleblower program.

As we have discussed previously, bribery of foreign government officials is the subject of many cases filed by the SEC under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Those cases, which often bring significant recoveries, will increase in number as a result of rewards to whistleblowers under the new SEC Whistleblower program that we have followed.

The SEC today announced the successful conclusion of an FCPA investigation of Maxwell Technologies, Inc. The SEC announced it had filed a "settled" case through which Maxwell agreed to pay $6.3 million in disgorgement and interest, based on allegations that a Maxwell subsidiary "repeatedly" paid bribes to Chinese government officials. The object was to obtain business from Chinese entities owned by the state.

In a related criminal case, Maxwell reportedly agreed to pay an $8 million criminal penalty in installments.

According to the SEC's announcement, as a result of this "bribery scheme, Maxwell SA was awarded contracts that generated over $15 million in revenues and $5.6 million in profits for Maxwell."

FCPA cases should only increase based on the new rewards to SEC Whistleblowers.

I recently had the opportunity to meet and discuss the developing rules for the new SEC Whistleblower program with SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro, Director of Division of Enforcement Robert Khuzami, and SEC staff, as well as separately with each of the other Commissioners Luis A. Aguilar, Kathleen L. Casey, Troy A. Paredes, and Elisse B. Walter. I was impressed by the close attention each is paying to establishing what we hope will be a meaningful SEC Whistleblower program.

So long as industry representatives do not convince the SEC to jettison the proven procedures followed in the most highly successful whistleblower rewards programs under the False Claims Act and the IRS Whistleblower statute, the nation will have an historic opportunity to stop fraud that falls within the SEC's jurisdiction.

The SEC's release today is linked here:

The SEC has just announced that current senior advisor to SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro, Stephen L. Cohen, has been named an Associate Director of the Division of Enforcement.

We hope this is good news for the nascent SEC Whistleblower Program. The SEC recently announced that its delaying creation of an SEC Whistleblower Office for budget reasons.

Steve Cohen has advised Chairman Schapiro on a number of issues including the SEC Whistleblower program, which I have discussed with him briefly earlier this year.

Coincidentally, the announcement came on yesterday's deadline for comments on the SEC's proposed rules for SEC whistleblowers, which must be substantially revamped so as not to defeat Congress' purpose by discouraging meaningful whistleblowers from coming forward. We have submitted our own comments to the SEC on its proposed whistleblower rules, and will discuss later others' comments here. See our comments

The SEC's press release is reprinted below:

Continue reading "New SEC Whistleblower Program to Benefit from SEC's Appointment of New Enforcement Official?" »

Yesterday's Wall Street Journal reports a "sweeping" insider trading investigation, with civil and criminal charges soon to follow, involving "consultants, investment bankers, hedge-fund and mutual-fund traders, and analysts across the nation."

While the details remain to be seen, the unending series of fraud cases that continue--despite Sarbanes-Oxley--proves why Wall Street must not be allowed to neuter the first potentially meaningful SEC whistleblower program, mandated by the Dodd-Frank financial reform law.

How is it that the hallowed "compliance programs" born from Sarbanes-Oxley have utterly failed to stop the breathtaking frauds of Madoff, Stanford, and other recent post-SOX scandals?

As many honest employees encountering fraud discover, too often "compliance programs" mask efforts to identify employees who object to wrongdoing, so the wrongdoers can then gut their careers.

How well did compliance programs work at the many Madoff-abetting feeder funds that made scores of millions, as Madoff's scheme spread to snare more victims? Read Harry Markopolis' book to see how many of those firms' "compliance" efforts worked, as Madoff's enablers ignored glaring warning signs that multiplied over the life of the scheme.

SEC Chair Mary Schapiro and Director of Enforcement Robert Khuzami seem dedicated to invigorating the SEC's enforcement efforts. While the new proposed SEC whistleblower rules show considerable thought, they threaten the program's effectiveness by bowing too far to industry concerns, and excluding many potential whistleblowers such as accountants, who may be the best position to stop the next Madoff.

Wall Street would have the SEC create a labyrinth of further exceptions to who can participate in the new SEC Whistleblower program. One lethal industry proposal is to require potential whistleblowers first to run the gauntlet of firms' "compliance" programs--a concept wholly inconsistent with Congress' intent that whistleblowers must be allowed to report violations anonymously.

The initial screening of SEC whistleblower claims should not be outsourced to the very firms alleged to have violated the law, which is what mandatory internal reporting effectively would do. The SEC--like the Department of Justice and IRS--should be the first to screen SEC whistleblower claims. With any SEC whistleblower claim large enough to pursue, by definition the culpable firm has typically approved the violation, or at least looked the other way.

Otherwise, who in a position to expose significant fraud would come forward, if required first to reveal their objections to the fraud to those who may have approved it? And if the fraud stays concealed--as it too often has despite "compliance" programs--the public loses.

Excerpts from the WSJ article by SUSAN PULLIAM, MICHAEL ROTHFELD,JENNY STRASBURG and GREGORY ZUCKERMAN are below:

Continue reading "Insider Trading Probe Reinforces Immediate Need for Strongest SEC Whistleblower Program" »

We have been awaiting the SEC's proposed rules for its new SEC Whistleblower Program, released yesterday. Even before the announcement, however, those who oppose this first potentially meaningful SEC Whistleblower Program have begun efforts to undermine it.

The SEC's website already includes some firms' suggestions to impose extreme restrictions on SEC whistleblowers--contrary to how other successful whistleblower programs operate.

Designing any new whistleblower program should begin with studying more than two decades of successes of the nation's major whistleblower law, the False Claims Act. The False Claims Act has been so effective in uncovering and penalizing fraud against the government since 1986 that it has inspired Congress and the states to enact a wave of new whistleblower statutes--including the Dodd-Frank whistleblower mandate in section 922.

Unless the SEC seeks to create an ineffective program, it makes no sense to impose restrictions on whistleblowers that do not exist in False Claims Act cases.

One such damaging restriction would be requiring whistleblowers first to report within the company violations of the law, before going to the SEC. Past experience with the False Claims Act shows that warning violators of the law (who know their own violations) invites destruction of evidence by those who engineered the lawbreaking, and destroys the whistleblower's career.

Other deceptive suggestions are that the SEC follow the "approach" of the promising new IRS Whistleblower Program--but with far greater restrictions on whistleblowing.

For example, one representative of future defendants urges what are actually variations on the "one-bite" and "no-bite" rules of the IRS, which historically have restricted the IRS's receipt of certain information, or information from certain whistleblowers.

In fact, the IRS trend appears to be the opposite. In a March 2010 IRS Notice and in June 2010 changes to the Internal Revenue Manual, the "one-bite" rule appears to be giving way to the more sensible approach of allowing whistleblowers more than "one bite" at submitting information that may be useful to the IRS.

Likewise, a suggestion that the SEC adopt a variation the "no-bite" rule would expand it far beyond the IRS concept of not accepting information from the "taxpayer's representative" before the IRS. This suggestion would go much further and prohibit submissions to the SEC by anyone who has a "fiduciary" duty to a public company--which arguably could be most or all employees.

We will comment further on the specifics of yesterday's proposed rules, but the basic principles above should guide the SEC in what it finally decides.

The SEC's announcement yesterday is reprinted below:

Continue reading "With New SEC Whistleblower Program Proposed Rules Announced, Will the SEC Allow Potential Defendants to Gut Them?" »

Our whistleblower lawyer blog has followed closely the development of the first potentially meaningful SEC Whistleblower and Commodities Whistleblower Programs. That link provides regular updates.

Based on our firm's long experience in representing whistleblowers, we were asked by the Senate Banking Committee staff for input in how the new SEC and CFTC whistleblower provisions of the July 2010 Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Act should work. We urged that the Senate change the tepid House version, which provided no meaningful rewards to whistleblowers, in favor of an enforceable right for SEC and CFTC whistleblowers to a significant reward.

Fortunately, that approach is now the law. We are currently working on select Dodd-Frank whistleblower matters involving SEC whistleblowers and Commodities whistleblowers, as well as our False Claims Act and IRS Whistleblower cases. Those cases include a growing area of enforcement, bribery of foreign government officials and other violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).

For a free consultation about a potential whistleblower claim, please call us at 800-228-9159, or email us HERE.

One of the most interesting twists to the new SEC Whistleblower Program will be how many commercial bribes and kickbacks paid to foreign government officials will now come to light. As we have written about previously, the SEC shares jurisdiction with the Justice Department over such cases that violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).

An example of why whistleblowers will come forward is this afternoon's announcement of the SEC's $39 million settlement with ABB Ltd ("ABB"), a Swiss company that provides power and automation products and services.

The SEC alleged that ABB made more than $2.7 million in bribes and kickbacks to obtain more than $100 million in contracts. The payments allegedly were made to "government officials in Mexico to obtain business with government owned power companies," and to the "former regime in Iraq to obtain contracts under the United Nations Oil for Food Program."

According to the SEC, some of the kickbacks were made through bank guarantees and cash payments. As is common in disguising unlawful payments, the kickbacks were recorded on the company's books as legitimate payments--here, for "after sales services," "consultation costs," and "commissions."

ABB, without admitting or denying the allegations in the complaint, agreed not only to pay disgorgement and penalties totalling more than $39 million, but also agreed to pay a criminal fine of $30,420,000, according to the SEC. The company also agreed to be bound by certain "undertakings" concerning its FCPA compliance program.

As to how an FCPA whistleblower might fare who reports similar FCPA violations of bribery of foreign government officials, the new SEC Whistleblower Program pays 10% to 30% of monetary sanctions collected--approximately $4 million to $12 million under similar facts.

The SEC's announcement is reprinted in full below, and the SEC's Complaint is linked here:

Continue reading "SEC Recovers $39 Million under Foreign Corrupt Practices Act for Bribery and Kickbacks in Mexico and Iraq" »

When Pharma manufacturers are targeted by the Department of Justice, qui tam whistleblower cases under the False Claims Act are often the reason.

Now, whistleblowers may also receive rewards for reporting violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), thanks to the new whistleblower provisions of the Wall Street financial reform law. Announcements like Merck's recent SEC filing that it is now the subject an FCPA investigation involving other Pharma companies should become common, as corruption will now be increasingly exposed in a new wave of SEC Whistleblower cases.

The recent 10-Q filing of Merck & Co., Inc. stated in part:

The Company has received letters from the DOJ and the SEC that seek information about activities in a number of countries and reference the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The Company is cooperating with the agencies in their requests and believes that this inquiry is part of a broader review of pharmaceutical industry practices in foreign countries.

As we have followed through its development, the Dodd-Frank financial reform law created the new SEC Whistleblower and CFTC Whistleblower programs, which will include FCPA cases.

The FCPA, as we have discussed previously, prohibits bribery of foreign government officials in international business transactions, and false entries in books and records of those companies within the statute. Whistleblowers who assist the SEC recover monetary sanctions in FCPA cases now have an enforceable right to a monetary award of 10-30%.

Pharma's exposure for any bribes and kickbacks abroad are a ripe subject for FCPA enforcement.

Continue reading "Merck and Other Pharma Companies Probed by DOJ and SEC in Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) Investigation" »

Only days after the new financial reform law created the first potentially meaningful awards for whistleblowers reporting securities and commodities violations and abuses, the SEC may have signaled a new attitude toward encouraging whistleblowers.

The SEC recently announced its first million dollar award for a whistleblower's report of information about insider trading involving hedge fund adviser Pequot Capital Management, Inc., its chief executive, Arthur J. Samberg, and David E. Zilkha, a Microsoft employee.

Although $1 million may not sound like much when compared to the losses caused by the Madoffs of the world, it is a dramatic improvement over what the SEC had done before.

In following the development of the new SEC Whistleblower Program, we previously discussed the Inspector General's summary of how, over the past eleven years, the SEC had paid a total of less than $160,000 to reward whistleblowers under the "old" SEC bounty program for whistleblowers. The IG reported:

The SEC bounty program has made very few payments to whistleblowers since its inception and received a relatively small number of bounty applications. As a result, the program’s success has been minimal and its existence is practically unknown.
Since the inception of the SEC bounty program in 1989, the SEC has paid a total of $159,537 to five claimants as detailed in Table 1 below.

Source: OIG Generated

Just as another Inspector General's report in 2006 set the stage for the successful new IRS Whistleblower Program that is attracting many reports of even billions in tax liability, let's hope this Inspector General's report has motivated the SEC to make full use of the opportunity to build a meaningful whistleblower program. We are already getting calls from potential Wall Street whistleblowers wishing to take advantage of it, and it could be a rewarding process--depending on how well the SEC seizes the opportunity.

The SEC's recent announcement of the $1 million reward is reprinted below:

Continue reading "Does SEC Whistleblower Reward of $1 Million Signal A New Attitude Toward Wall Street Whistleblowing? " »

When the President signed the new financial reform bill into law today, new whistleblower provisions quietly took effect to battle corruption, bribery, and corporate fraud to obtain foreign government contracts.

This new law creates the new SEC whistleblower program that we have followed since its gestation after the Madoff scandal broke. The SEC and the U.S. Department of Justice share jurisdiction over a growing and increasingly important area of enforcement, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).

Bribery of foreign government officials in international business transactions, and false entries in books and records of those companies within the statute, are the targets of the FCPA. Whistleblowers whose information helps the SEC recover monetary sanctions from those corrupt entities in FCPA cases now have an enforceable right to a monetary award of 10-30%.

Based on the increasing number and size of these FCPA cases, the rewards to whistleblowers can be meaningful--as they must be to cause whistleblowers to come forward. Over the past decade, the government has pursued more and more FCPA cases, and some recover hundreds of millions of dollars.

Recall that, in late 2008, Siemens agreed to pay more than $1.6 billion to the United States and Germany, after allegedly paying "$1.4 billion in bribes to government officials in Asia, Africa, Europe, the Middle East and the Americas." Announcing the guilty plea and settlement, the government described "a corporate culture in which bribery was tolerated and even rewarded at the highest levels of the company."

The SEC obtained $350 million in disgorgement from that settlement, which was the largest FCPA settlement to date.

In announcing that 2008 recovery, the government explained that "there is no question that the Department has in recent years significantly increased its FCPA enforcement. From 2001 to 2004, the Department resolved or charged 17 FCPA cases. For the period of 2005 to 2008, that number is 42 resolutions, representing an increase of more than 200 percent within these four years as compared to the prior four-year period."

With money scarce both at home and abroad, it is even more urgent to recoup funds lost to fraud. The new SEC whistleblower awards and Commodity Futures Trading Commission rewards should prompt more efficient law enforcement efforts to stop this fraud, just as the False Claims Act and the new IRS Whistleblower Program have shown is possible.

This corruption harms legitimate businesses, who cannot compete when corruption prevents a level playing field. This crime also causes damage to others, as the government explained in announcing the Siemens settlement. That transcript is reprinted below, and in part states:

For let there be no doubt that corruption is not a victimless offense. Corruption is not a gentlemen's agreement where no one gets hurt. People do get hurt. And the people who are hurt the worst are often residents of the poorest countries on the face of the earth, especially where it occurs in the context of government infrastructure projects, contracts in which crucial development decisions are made, in which a country will live by those decisions for good or for bad for years down the road, and where those decisions are made using precious and scarce national resources.

To illustrate the types of corruption this new whistleblower law should bring to light more often, the government's announcement of the 2008 Siemens settlement is reprinted below:

Continue reading "New Rewards for Whistleblowers Reporting Bribery of Foreign Government Officials, Corporate Fraud In Foreign Government Contracts" »

The new financial reform bill that awaits the President's signature this week has something important for potential whistleblowers with knowledge of fraud in options, futures, derivatives and other financial products within the jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). The bill will modify the Commodity Exchange Act to provide whistleblower rewards and protections.

Similar to the new SEC whistleblower awards for persons who reports securities fraud, the rewards to whistleblowers will be available if the CFTC recovers monetary sanctions of more than $1 million because of the whistleblower's information.

Like SEC whistleblowers, CFTC whistleblowers will have an enforceable right to 10-30% of what the CFTC recovers in substantial cases when the whistleblower has "voluntarily provided original information to the Commission that led to the successful enforcement of the covered judicial or administrative action, or related action." (Section 748 of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, reprinted below).

Crucial to the success of these new whistleblower programs, whistleblowers will know that they will receive at least 10% of the recovery in significant cases when the whistleblower meets the law's criteria.

The history of the nation's major whistleblower statute, the False Claims Act, shows that guarantees of meaningful rewards are the critical element in causing whistleblowers to report substantial fraud. Fraud recoveries increased dramatically once Congress amended the False Claims Act in 1986 to provide meaningful whistleblower rewards of 15-25% in cases in which the government intervenes.

The new IRS Whistleblower Program is proving the same point, as quality submissions have poured in now that a right to a meaningful whistleblower award exists.

Congress has set forth general criteria for the CFTC to determine the amount of the award within the 10-30% range. Factors that the CFTC will consider include:

"(I) the significance of the information provided by the whistleblower to the success of the covered judicial or administrative action;

‘‘(IV) such additional relevant factors as the Commission may establish by rule or regulation".

Continue reading "Whistleblowers Reporting Derivatives Fraud? Whistleblower Incentives Must Be Paid by CFTC Under New Financial Reform Bill" »

Since the SEC refused for years to heed Madoff whistleblower Harry Markopolis' warnings that Madoff was running a Ponzi scheme, we have followed with great interest the efforts of those who sought to create the first meaningful SEC whistleblower program.

The Senate this week took an important step by authorizing a new SEC whistleblower program--one more potent than the SEC apparently wanted--as part of the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.

When the Madoff fiasco surfaced, Congress asked why the law failed to encourage SEC whistleblowers to come forward, in the same way the qui tam whistleblower provisions of the False Claims Act have been so successful in rewarding whistleblowers for helping stop fraud against the government. Those same principles in the new IRS Whistleblower program have caused an explosion of valuable information presented by whistleblowers in exposing tax liability of many billions of dollars.

SEC leadership helped shape the tepid House version, which would have made rewards to whistleblowers wholly discretionary.

When we criticized the House version of the proposed SEC whistleblower rewards for that reason, staffers of the Senate Banking Committee contacted us to discuss what a meaningful whistleblower program should include, based on our experience with whistleblowers under the False Claims Act and IRS Whistleblower program. Our response was that, at minimum, a whistleblower with information about significant fraud must have a legally enforceable right to a meaningful reward.

Fortunately, the Senate version included such a right to an award of 10-30% in substantial cases, and the Senate view ultimately prevailed (see below text of whistleblower provisions in Section 922).

It remains to be seen how SEC leadership will respond. At this spring's Offshore Alert Conference in Miami, an SEC official listened to his panelists describe how successful mandatory rewards have been in causing whistleblowers to come forward in False Claims Act cases and IRS Whistleblower claims, yet apparently failed to "get" that SEC whistleblowers need a similar incentive to come forward in the best cases.

In our experience in representing whistleblowers, persons with the most significant information will rarely come forward without an enforceable right to a meaningful reward. The SEC has not exactly fostered public confidence in its judgment in recent years. If it embraces whistleblowers as Congress has directed, the SEC will find that--like the IRS Whistleblower Office--it will receive better, and dramatically more, information about fraud within its jurisdiction.

The full text of section 922 regarding SEC whistleblowers is reprinted below:

Continue reading "New SEC Whistleblower Program Approved by Senate in Financial Reform Bill" »

As we have written previously, the billions of "bailout" dollars to financial institutions through the TARP program inevitably would result in many fraud cases, including some by TARP whistleblowers.

Today, the SEC announced allegations of TARP fraud and securities fraud of more than $1.5 billion other violations against Lee B. Farkas, through his company Taylor, Bean & Whitaker Mortgage Corp. (TBW).

According to the SEC, Farkas "sold more than $1.5 billion worth of fabricated or impaired mortgage loans and securities to Colonial Bank. Those loans and securities were falsely reported to the investing public as high-quality, liquid assets. Farkas also was responsible for a bogus equity investment that caused Colonial Bank to misrepresent that it had satisfied a prerequisite necessary to qualify for TARP funds. When Colonial Bank's parent company — Colonial BancGroup, Inc. — issued a press release announcing it had obtained preliminary approval to receive $550 million in TARP funds, its stock price jumped 54 percent in the remaining two hours of trading, representing its largest one-day price increase since 1983."

Perhaps the SEC is showing a new attitude after the Madoff debacle. Whistleblowers should soon be able to participate in the new SEC whistleblower program, which is part of the financial reform legislation now being hashed out in conference committee.

The SEC's full release is reprinted below:

Continue reading "TARP Fraud and Other Violations Alleged by SEC Against Chairman of Major Mortgage Lender " »

Congress is at a crossroads in deciding whether there will be a meaningful SEC Whistleblower Program--for the first time.

At this morning's Offshore Alert conference in Miami, we heard from the SEC Chair's Senior Advisor Stephen Cohen on this subject, as well as insight from IRS Whistleblower Office Director Steve Whitlock on how the IRS Whistleblower Program is now designed to encourage whistleblower claims.

As we have observed previously about the bills that would create an SEC Whistleblower program, past experience shows that an enforceable right to a meaningful reward is essential to cause whistleblowers to come forward.

The SEC apparently resists guaranteeing whistleblowers a minimum percentage of dollars recovered, as evidenced by the House version of the bill that lacks this feature. The SEC’s Steve Cohen explained that the SEC does not wish to commit funds that might otherwise go to harmed investors. He nonetheless contended that the SEC’s proposal may be better for whistleblowers because it pays from a special fund designated for this purpose, based on sanctions imposed, not collected.

Compare the experiences of the Justice Department and the IRS, however. When each had whistleblower statutes that provided no meaningful right to a reward, whistleblower claims were small and few. We have written extensively about the dramatic successes of the False Claims Act since its rewards increased to meaningful levels in 1986.

Likewise, IRS Whistleblower Office Director Steve Whitlock described again today how large whistleblower claims have exploded since December 2006, when Congress doubled rewards to whistleblowers to 15-30%, and created an enforceable right to those rewards.

History proves that most whistleblowers simply will remain silent, without a right to meaningful rewards. The SEC will be dividing a small pie unless Congress again embraces this principle.

To protect investors, those with information about fraud must have every incentive to speak up--as early as possible--and to be heard. The Madoff debacle proved that point.

In our experience in representing whistleblowers in the financial industry, the Senate’s version of the SEC whistleblower changes is highly preferable. It creates a right to awards of 10-30%.

There are still glaring deficiencies, such as the provisions excluding auditors who have tried unsuccessfully to call attention to fraud within the organizations and auditing firms involved. It will be an interesting next few weeks as Congress debates the final result.

Continue reading "Should SEC Whistleblowers Have Right to Share in Recoveries That They Cause?" »

As Congress finally works to establish a more meaningful SEC whistleblower program, the SEC has just announced that it has charged Goldman Sachs and one of its vice presidents with fraud, in connection with a "financial product tied to subprime mortgages, as the U.S. housing market was beginning to falter."

Often maligned for failing to protect investors before the recent financial crisis, the SEC now charges that Goldman structured and marketed a "synthetic collateralized debt obligation" (CDO) like those that "contributed to the recent financial crisis by magnifying losses associated with the downturn in the United States housing market," and then violated the federal securities laws in connection with that product.

The SEC's Complaint alleges a "securities fraud action against Goldman, Sachs & Co. (“GS&Co”) and a GS&Co employee, Fabrice Tourre ('Tourre'), for making materially misleading statements and omissions in connection with a synthetic collateralized debt obligation (“CDO”) GS&Co structured and marketed to investors. This synthetic CDO, ABACUS 2007AC1, was tied to the performance of subprime residential mortgage-backed securities (“RMBS”) and was structured and marketed by GS&Co in early 2007 when the United States housing market and related securities were beginning to show signs of distress."

The Complaint further charges:

Undisclosed in the marketing materials and unbeknownst to investors, a large hedge fund, Paulson & Co. Inc. (“Paulson”), with economic interests directly adverse to investors in the ABACUS 2007-AC1 CDO, played a significant role in the portfolio selection process. After participating in the selection of the reference portfolio, Paulson effectively shorted the RMBS portfolio it helped select by entering into credit default swaps (“CDS”) with GS&Co to buy protection on specific layers of the ABACUS 2007-AC1 capital structure. Given its financial short interest, Paulson had an economic incentive to choose RMBS that it expected to experience credit events in the near future. GS&Co did not disclose Paulson’s adverse economic interests or its role in the portfolio selection process in the term sheet, flip book, offering memorandum or other marketing materials provided to investors.

In sum, GS&Co arranged a transaction at Paulson’s request in which Paulson heavily influenced the selection of the portfolio to suit its economic interests, but failed to disclose to investors, as part of the description of the portfolio selection process contained in the marketing materials used to promote the transaction, Paulson’s role in the portfolio selection process or its adverse economic interests.

The full SEC anouncement is reprinted below.

Continue reading "SEC Charges Goldman Sachs With Fraud in Synthetic CDO Tied to Subprime Mortgages" »

Post-Madoff, we have followed the legislative efforts to help establish an effective SEC whistleblower program. We know that the Senate Banking Committee in particular has worked hard in attempting to devise the best overall arrangement to encourage and reward whistleblowers who report fraud within the SEC's jurisdiction.

Shortly before Congress authorized the first meaningful IRS Whistleblower Program in December 2006, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration issued its report on many of the changes needed for the IRS to use whistleblowers effectively.

Now, the SEC's Inspector General David Kotz has issued his report, "Assessment of the SEC Bounty Program." No one is surprised that it concludes that the SEC has not effectively encouraged, used, or rewarded whistleblowers over the past decades. Perhaps this report will pave the way for something meaningful--like the TIGTA report that preceded the now-promising IRS Whistleblower Program, which rewards whistleblowers with 15-30% of the government's tax recoveries.

The SEC report recommends adopting the "best practices obtained from DOJ and the IRS into the SEC bounty program." The SEC Inspector General's report states as follows:

Although the SEC has had a bounty program in-place for more than 20
years for rewarding whistleblowers for insider trading tips and complaints, our
review found that there have been very few payments made under this program.
Likewise, the Commission has not received a large number of applications from
individuals seeking a bounty over this 20-year period. We also found that the
program is not widely recognized inside or outside the Commission. Additionally,
while the Commission recently asked for expanded authority from Congress to
reward whistleblowers who bring forward substantial evidence about other
significant federal securities law violations, we found that the current SEC bounty
program is not fundamentally well-designed to be successful.

Continue reading "SEC Whistleblower Program--The SEC Inspector General's Report" »

Since the Madoff and Stanford schemes proved ruinous to so many investors, many have asked why the SEC has no meaningful "whistleblower" program to expose wrongdoing, a topic we have written about previously.

Perhaps Harry Markopolis' voice is finally being heard, albeit faintly. Last week, the House Financial Services Committee approved legislation that would expand both whistleblower rewards and whistleblower protections, among other things.

Still, past experience with the False Claims Act and the IRS Whistleblower statute shows that the proposed rewards need to be beefed up to be effective.

The “Investor Protection Act of 2009” (excerpted below) also would increase the SEC’s budget and make other changes designed to strengthen enforcement.

The new rewards to whistleblowers would be up to 30% of monetary sanctions of more than $1 million:

"In any judicial or administrative action brought by the Commission under the securities laws that results in monetary sanctions exceeding $1,000,000, the Commission, under regulations prescribed by the Commission and subject to subsection (b), may pay an award or awards not exceeding an amount equal to 30 percent, in total, of the monetary sanctions imposed in the action or related actions to one or more whistleblowers who voluntarily provided original information to the Commission that led to the successful enforcement of the action."

The proposed new whistleblower rewards are reminiscent of those under the new IRS Whistleblower Program, but need at least two corrections to be effective.

First, the current SEC bill creates no enforceable "right" to a reward--a defect that made the old IRS Whistleblower statute ineffective before it was amended in December 2006.

Second, there should be a minimum percentage of perhaps 15% for the SEC rewards; it should not be left at 0-30%, as the bill now reads. Who would risk a 1% (or even lower) reward? The False Claims Act only became effective after 1986 amendments increased rewards to at least 15% in most cases. The new IRS Whistleblower law is attracting whistleblowers left and right because it provides for a minimum of 15% in most instances.

The proposed SEC law has one advantage over the IRS version: The IRS law unfortunately omits protection of whistleblowers from retaliation, but the proposed SEC whistleblower provisions would provide a remedy similar to that furnished whistleblowers under the False Claims Act. Here is what the proposed bill states (in part):

"An employee, contractor, or agent prevailing in any action brought under subparagraph (B) shall be entitled to all relief necessary to make that employee, contractor, or agent whole, including reinstatement with the same seniority status that the employee, contractor, or agent would have had, but for the discrimination, 2 times the amount of back pay, with interest, and compensation for any special damages sustained as a result of the discrimination, including litigation costs, expert witness fees, and reasonable attorneys' fees."

The bill's proposed SEC whistleblower language is below; the entire bill may be found here:

Continue reading "New SEC Whistleblower Rewards and Whistleblower Protections Approved by House Committee--But Improvements Are Needed" »

Could a meaningful SEC "whistleblower" program prevent the next Madoff or Stanford debacle? The SEC and legislators are now seriously considering that question. That Madoff managed to defraud investors for so long proves that the current system is inadequate.

Past experience proves that incentives to whistleblowers to report illegal acts work. The nation's primary "anti-fraud" statute that protects federal funds, the False Claims Act, has been extremely successful in encouraging whistleblowers to come forward by allowing them to share in the government's recovery.

As we have written about extensively on this whistleblower lawyer blog, based on the successes of the False Claims Act in fighting and deterring fraud, Congress has encouraged states to enact their own similar state false claims acts with incentives for whistleblowers to expose fraud (and almost half of the states now have such laws).

Likewise, in December 2006 Congress created the first meaningful IRS Whistleblower Program, which we regularly follow here. At present, the IRS Whistleblower Program created in December 2006 may help ferret out some SEC violations when the violator also has significant tax liability to the IRS.

Hedge fund abuses with tax consequences are already the subject of some IRS Whistleblower claims, and more will follow as the IRS Whistleblower Program gains notoriety. Based on our dealings with the IRS in pursuing these claims, this IRS Whistleblower Program has great promise.

But the IRS provisions simply do not cover all of the wrongdoing that goes on. Thus, the SEC desperately needs its own "whistleblower" program, with meaningful incentives to encourage citizens who report wrongdoing.

The SEC's existing "whistleblower" provisions are too limited to be effective. 15 U.S.C. § 78U-1(e) authorizes a "bounty" to whistleblowers of what is effectively 0-10% of civil penalties paid in insider trading cases. (See full text here.) Thus, the SEC's existing incentives are limited to insider trading cases, and do not address any other securities laws violations.

Like the "old" IRS Whistleblower rewards, very few awards have been made by the SEC, even in insider trading cases. Moreover, there is no "right" to a reward even if the whistleblower's information causes the government to recover money from wrongdoers. A system of small, discretionary, and infrequent payments is simply ineffective to cause whistleblowers to come forward.

We understand that the SEC has been looking to correct this gap in protecting investors. This week, Rep.Paul E. Kanjorski (D-PA), the Chairman of the House Financial Services Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises, released a letter from U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Inspector General H. David Kotz. The IG seems to understand the need to modernize the SEC's incentives to whistleblowers, in his recommendations below:

Continue reading "New SEC Whistleblower Program & Hedge Fund Investor Protections On Way, to Supplement IRS Whistleblower Program? Congress & SEC Consider Changes After Madoff, Stanford Schemes " »

The statute authorizing the SEC in insider trading cases to pay whistleblowers "bounties" of up to 10% of civil penalties is below. (See our separate post discussing why the SEC needs a new, meaningful whistleblower program to help stop the next Madoff scheme.)

Continue reading "SEC "Bounties" for Whistleblowers--The Statute" »