SEC Whistleblower Program & CFTC Whistleblower Program

TARP Fraud and Other Violations Alleged by SEC Against Chairman of Major Mortgage Lender

Published on: June 16, 2010 | by Michael Sullivan

As we have written previously, the billions of “bailout” dollars to financial institutions through the TARP program inevitably would result in many fraud cases, including some by TARP whistleblowers.

Today, the SEC announced allegations of TARP fraud and securities fraud of more than $1.5 billion other violations against Lee B. Farkas, through his company Taylor, Bean & Whitaker Mortgage Corp. (TBW).

According to the SEC, Farkas “sold more than $1.5 billion worth of fabricated or impaired mortgage loans and securities to Colonial Bank. Those loans and securities were falsely reported to the investing public as high-quality, liquid assets. Farkas also was responsible for a bogus equity investment that caused Colonial Bank to misrepresent that it had satisfied a prerequisite necessary to qualify for TARP funds. When Colonial Bank’s parent company – Colonial BancGroup, Inc. – issued a press release announcing it had obtained preliminary approval to receive $550 million in TARP funds, its stock price jumped 54 percent in the remaining two hours of trading, representing its largest one-day price increase since 1983.”

Perhaps the SEC is showing a new attitude after the Madoff debacle. Whistleblowers should soon be able to participate in the new SEC whistleblower program, which is part of the financial reform legislation now being hashed out in conference committee.

The SEC’s full release is reprinted below:
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Should SEC Whistleblowers Have Right to Share in Recoveries That They Cause?

Published on: May 4, 2010 | by Michael Sullivan

Congress is at a crossroads in deciding whether there will be a meaningful SEC Whistleblower Program–for the first time.

At this morning’s Offshore Alert conference in Miami, we heard from the SEC Chair’s Senior Advisor Stephen Cohen on this subject, as well as insight from IRS Whistleblower Office Director Steve Whitlock on how the IRS Whistleblower Program is now designed to encourage whistleblower claims.

As we have observed previously about the bills that would create an SEC Whistleblower program, past experience shows that an enforceable right to a meaningful reward is essential to cause whistleblowers to come forward.

The SEC apparently resists guaranteeing whistleblowers a minimum percentage of dollars recovered, as evidenced by the House version of the bill that lacks this feature. The SEC’s Steve Cohen explained that the SEC does not wish to commit funds that might otherwise go to harmed investors. He nonetheless contended that the SEC’s proposal may be better for whistleblowers because it pays from a special fund designated for this purpose, based on sanctions imposed, not collected.

Compare the experiences of the Justice Department and the IRS, however. When each had whistleblower statutes that provided no meaningful right to a reward, whistleblower claims were small and few. We have written extensively about the dramatic successes of the False Claims Act since its rewards increased to meaningful levels in 1986.

Likewise, IRS Whistleblower Office Director Steve Whitlock described again today how large whistleblower claims have exploded since December 2006, when Congress doubled rewards to whistleblowers to 15-30%, and created an enforceable right to those rewards.

History proves that most whistleblowers simply will remain silent, without a right to meaningful rewards. The SEC will be dividing a small pie unless Congress again embraces this principle.

To protect investors, those with information about fraud must have every incentive to speak up–as early as possible–and to be heard. The Madoff debacle proved that point.

In our experience in representing whistleblowers in the financial industry, the Senate’s version of the SEC whistleblower changes is highly preferable. It creates a right to awards of 10-30%.

There are still glaring deficiencies, such as the provisions excluding auditors who have tried unsuccessfully to call attention to fraud within the organizations and auditing firms involved. It will be an interesting next few weeks as Congress debates the final result.
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SEC Charges Goldman Sachs With Fraud in Synthetic CDO Tied to Subprime Mortgages

Published on: April 16, 2010 | by Michael Sullivan

As Congress finally works to establish a more meaningful SEC whistleblower program, the SEC has just announced that it has charged Goldman Sachs and one of its vice presidents with fraud, in connection with a “financial product tied to subprime mortgages, as the U.S. housing market was beginning to falter.”

Often maligned for failing to protect investors before the recent financial crisis, the SEC now charges that Goldman structured and marketed a “synthetic collateralized debt obligation” (CDO) like those that “contributed to the recent financial crisis by magnifying losses associated with the downturn in the United States housing market,” and then violated the federal securities laws in connection with that product.

The SEC’s Complaint alleges a “securities fraud action against Goldman, Sachs & Co. (“GS&Co”) and a GS&Co employee, Fabrice Tourre (‘Tourre’), for making materially misleading statements and omissions in connection with a synthetic collateralized debt obligation (“CDO”) GS&Co structured and marketed to investors. This synthetic CDO, ABACUS 2007AC1, was tied to the performance of subprime residential mortgage-backed securities (“RMBS”) and was structured and marketed by GS&Co in early 2007 when the United States housing market and related securities were beginning to show signs of distress.”

The Complaint further charges:

Undisclosed in the marketing materials and unbeknownst to investors, a large hedge fund, Paulson & Co. Inc. (“Paulson”), with economic interests directly adverse to investors in the ABACUS 2007-AC1 CDO, played a significant role in the portfolio selection process. After participating in the selection of the reference portfolio, Paulson effectively shorted the RMBS portfolio it helped select by entering into credit default swaps (“CDS”) with GS&Co to buy protection on specific layers of the ABACUS 2007-AC1 capital structure. Given its financial short interest, Paulson had an economic incentive to choose RMBS that it expected to experience credit events in the near future. GS&Co did not disclose Paulson’s adverse economic interests or its role in the portfolio selection process in the term sheet, flip book, offering memorandum or other marketing materials provided to investors.

In sum, GS&Co arranged a transaction at Paulson’s request in which Paulson heavily influenced the selection of the portfolio to suit its economic interests, but failed to disclose to investors, as part of the description of the portfolio selection process contained in the marketing materials used to promote the transaction, Paulson’s role in the portfolio selection process or its adverse economic interests.

The full SEC anouncement is reprinted below.
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SEC Whistleblower Program–The SEC Inspector General’s Report

Published on: April 5, 2010 | by Michael Sullivan

Post-Madoff, we have followed the legislative efforts to help establish an effective SEC whistleblower program. We know that the Senate Banking Committee in particular has worked hard in attempting to devise the best overall arrangement to encourage and reward whistleblowers who report fraud within the SEC’s jurisdiction.

Shortly before Congress authorized the first meaningful IRS Whistleblower Program in December 2006, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration issued its report on many of the changes needed for the IRS to use whistleblowers effectively.

Now, the SEC’s Inspector General David Kotz has issued his report, “Assessment of the SEC Bounty Program.” No one is surprised that it concludes that the SEC has not effectively encouraged, used, or rewarded whistleblowers over the past decades. Perhaps this report will pave the way for something meaningful–like the TIGTA report that preceded the now-promising IRS Whistleblower Program, which rewards whistleblowers with 15-30% of the government’s tax recoveries.

The SEC report recommends adopting the “best practices obtained from DOJ and the IRS into the SEC bounty program.” The SEC Inspector General’s report states as follows:

Although the SEC has had a bounty program in-place for more than 20 years for rewarding whistleblowers for insider trading tips and complaints, our review found that there have been very few payments made under this program.
Likewise, the Commission has not received a large number of applications from individuals seeking a bounty over this 20-year period. We also found that the program is not widely recognized inside or outside the Commission. Additionally,
while the Commission recently asked for expanded authority from Congress to reward whistleblowers who bring forward substantial evidence about other significant federal securities law violations, we found that the current SEC bounty program is not fundamentally well-designed to be successful.
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New SEC Whistleblower Rewards and Whistleblower Protections Approved by House Committee–But Improvements Are Needed

Published on: November 9, 2009 | by Michael Sullivan

Since the Madoff and Stanford schemes proved ruinous to so many investors, many have asked why the SEC has no meaningful “whistleblower” program to expose wrongdoing, a topic we have written about previously.

Perhaps Harry Markopolis’ voice is finally being heard, albeit faintly. Last week, the House Financial Services Committee approved legislation that would expand both whistleblower rewards and whistleblower protections, among other things.

Still, past experience with the False Claims Act and the IRS Whistleblower statute shows that the proposed rewards need to be beefed up to be effective.

The “Investor Protection Act of 2009” (excerpted below) also would increase the SEC’s budget and make other changes designed to strengthen enforcement.

The new rewards to whistleblowers would be up to 30% of monetary sanctions of more than $1 million:

“In any judicial or administrative action brought by the Commission under the securities laws that results in monetary sanctions exceeding $1,000,000, the Commission, under regulations prescribed by the Commission and subject to subsection (b), may pay an award or awards not exceeding an amount equal to 30 percent, in total, of the monetary sanctions imposed in the action or related actions to one or more whistleblowers who voluntarily provided original information to the Commission that led to the successful enforcement of the action.”

The proposed new whistleblower rewards are reminiscent of those under the new IRS Whistleblower Program, but need at least two corrections to be effective.

First, the current SEC bill creates no enforceable “right” to a reward–a defect that made the old IRS Whistleblower statute ineffective before it was amended in December 2006.

Second, there should be a minimum percentage of perhaps 15% for the SEC rewards; it should not be left at 0-30%, as the bill now reads. Who would risk a 1% (or even lower) reward? The False Claims Act only became effective after 1986 amendments increased rewards to at least 15% in most cases. The new IRS Whistleblower law is attracting whistleblowers left and right because it provides for a minimum of 15% in most instances.

The proposed SEC law has one advantage over the IRS version: The IRS law unfortunately omits protection of whistleblowers from retaliation, but the proposed SEC whistleblower provisions would provide a remedy similar to that furnished whistleblowers under the False Claims Act. Here is what the proposed bill states (in part):

“An employee, contractor, or agent prevailing in any action brought under subparagraph (B) shall be entitled to all relief necessary to make that employee, contractor, or agent whole, including reinstatement with the same seniority status that the employee, contractor, or agent would have had, but for the discrimination, 2 times the amount of back pay, with interest, and compensation for any special damages sustained as a result of the discrimination, including litigation costs, expert witness fees, and reasonable attorneys’ fees.”

The bill’s proposed SEC whistleblower language is below; the entire bill may be found here:
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New SEC Whistleblower Program & Hedge Fund Investor Protections On Way, to Supplement IRS Whistleblower Program? Congress & SEC Consider Changes After Madoff, Stanford Schemes

Published on: July 3, 2009 | by Michael Sullivan

Could a meaningful SEC “whistleblower” program prevent the next Madoff or Stanford debacle? The SEC and legislators are now seriously considering that question. That Madoff managed to defraud investors for so long proves that the current system is inadequate.

Past experience proves that incentives to whistleblowers to report illegal acts work. The nation’s primary “anti-fraud” statute that protects federal funds, the False Claims Act, has been extremely successful in encouraging whistleblowers to come forward by allowing them to share in the government’s recovery.

As we have written about extensively on this whistleblower lawyer blog, based on the successes of the False Claims Act in fighting and deterring fraud, Congress has encouraged states to enact their own similar state false claims acts with incentives for whistleblowers to expose fraud (and almost half of the states now have such laws).

Likewise, in December 2006 Congress created the first meaningful IRS Whistleblower Program, which we regularly follow here. At present, the IRS Whistleblower Program created in December 2006 may help ferret out some SEC violations when the violator also has significant tax liability to the IRS.

Hedge fund abuses with tax consequences are already the subject of some IRS Whistleblower claims, and more will follow as the IRS Whistleblower Program gains notoriety. Based on our dealings with the IRS in pursuing these claims, this IRS Whistleblower Program has great promise.

But the IRS provisions simply do not cover all of the wrongdoing that goes on. Thus, the SEC desperately needs its own “whistleblower” program, with meaningful incentives to encourage citizens who report wrongdoing.

The SEC’s existing “whistleblower” provisions are too limited to be effective. 15 U.S.C. § 78U-1(e) authorizes a “bounty” to whistleblowers of what is effectively 0-10% of civil penalties paid in insider trading cases. (See full text here.) Thus, the SEC’s existing incentives are limited to insider trading cases, and do not address any other securities laws violations.

Like the “old” IRS Whistleblower rewards, very few awards have been made by the SEC, even in insider trading cases. Moreover, there is no “right” to a reward even if the whistleblower’s information causes the government to recover money from wrongdoers. A system of small, discretionary, and infrequent payments is simply ineffective to cause whistleblowers to come forward.

We understand that the SEC has been looking to correct this gap in protecting investors. This week, Rep.Paul E. Kanjorski (D-PA), the Chairman of the House Financial Services Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises, released a letter from U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Inspector General H. David Kotz. The IG seems to understand the need to modernize the SEC’s incentives to whistleblowers, in his recommendations below:
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SEC “Bounties” for Whistleblowers–The Statute

Published on: July 3, 2009 | by Michael Sullivan

The statute authorizing the SEC in insider trading cases to pay whistleblowers “bounties” of up to 10% of civil penalties is below. (See our separate post discussing why the SEC needs a new, meaningful whistleblower program to help stop the next Madoff scheme.)
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